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Abstract
A wide diversity of rankings of opportunity sets are characterized
through what is now commonly called the freedom of choice literature.
We claim the normative content of each of these propositions can be
analyzed and clarified through a typology. We distinguish two kinds of
rankings: rankings according to one prudential value and rankings ac-
cording to several prudential values. In the first case, we present rank-
ings according to freedom. Different rankings correspond to different
meanings of freedom: freedom of choice, freedom as autonomy, freedom
as exercise of significant choices, negative freedom, positive freedom and
utility. In the second case, the rankings may capture meanwhile different
prudential values, namely utility and freedom. We organize the presen-
tation around different forms of commensurability between prudential
values: weighting, trumping, equal consideration and discontinuity.
JEL classification code: D11, D63, I31
Key-words: opportunity sets, freedom of choice, prudential values, plu-
rality, overall well-being, typology
∗Antoinette Baujard, CREM, University of Caen, Antoinette.Baujard@unicaen.fr
1
Conceptions of freedom and ranking opportunity sets. A typology
1 Introduction
The literature of ranking opportunity sets (see Barbera`, Bossert and Pattanaik
(2001)), tackles a wide range of problems such as choosing in an uncertain
environment or valuing freedom of choice per se. This article focuses on the
normative side of this literature, now standardly called the freedom of choice
literature and in which the range and/or the content of opportunity sets is at
stake.
To define what an opportunity set is, one can represent individual choice
as a two stage problem. At early stage, individual makes decisions which will
constraint the scope of later feasible choices over options. This amounts to
pick one set of options among many, or, at least, rank sets of options. A
later stages, individual will choose one option out of the previous set. Let’s
say an opportunity set is a restaurant menu: you first choose the restaurant
among all available restaurant in the city, then you pick a meal within the
chosen restaurant’s menu. The aim of the freedom of choice literature is to
rank opportunity sets according to some normative criterium such as utility,
freedom of choice, any notions of freedom, individual overall well-being.
Let X be the universal set of alternatives. Let x, y, ... ∈ X be the alter-
natives (commodities, options, actions...) the agent may be faced at second
stage. Let ]X be the cardinal of the set X. As in the traditional microeco-
nomic framework, individuals may have preferences over the alternatives. Let
R a reflexive and transitive binary relation over X. We may call it a preorder.
xRy means that the option x is at least considered as good as y according
to preferences R. The symmetric and asymmetric part of R are respectively
denoted I and P. Let Π(X) the power set of X, i.e. the set of all non-empty
subsets of X. The elements of Π(X), denoted as A,B, ... are the opportunity
sets the agent may be faced in the first stage. Let ]A be the cardinal of the set
A. Let º be a reflexive and transitive binary relation defined over Π(X). We
may call it a preorder. For all A,B ∈ Π(X), (A º B) is to be interpreted as
“the set A is considered at least equally good than B according to the specific
value at stake or the retained conception of well-being”. It could mean, for
instance: ‘A provides at least as much freedom as B’. The symmetric part
and assymetric part of º are respectively ∼ and Â. In the freedom of choice
literature, the preorder º is to be characterized axiomatically, i.e. the set
of basic conditions under which a specific ranking of opportunity sets hold is
specified.
The presentation of the freedom of choice literature in this paper is not in-
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tended to be an exhaustive survey1. I aim at proposing a typology of the formal
rankings displayed in this literature, according to the corresponding interpre-
tation. The typology relies on the study of the different kinds of conditions
leading to the results: normative criteria, state description. Each ranking is
eventually characterized by a combination of what I will call here ‘conditions’,
that are often called ‘axioms’ or ‘definitions’. Each of these conditions and
their combination contribute to capture some specific prudential value, such
as freedom or utility or specific notions of overall well-being.
An ideal typology should be summarized through a large table, with ax-
ioms in columns and specified rankings in rows. A ranking, characterized by
a set of axioms, would nicely be presented in such a table. Besides, each ax-
iom would be associated with some specific and stable interpretation. The
comparisons of rankings would be made very clear with such a presentation2.
Unfortunately, the freedom of choice literature is not enough unified to build
such a coherent table. The axioms to capture a specific meaning, such as the
strong monotonicity axiom for instance, are formulated in quite different ways
in different papers. Each paper indeed proposes a set of conditions consistent
with each other and what does capture the whole meaning of the ranking is
rather the combination of all. This yield us to present almost each time again
the used axioms. The deduced interpretations is explained for each ranking.
Other interpretations than those we will display in the article for each
contribution are then certainly possible. We do not pretend to close any dis-
cussions about the correct ones3. The attribution of sense to each ranking is
intended to be meaningful as a whole to be able to see where freedom of choice
literature is going, and so as to fathom each particular senses of the term ‘free-
dom’. This means authors might not recognize explicity one interpretation for
their own ranking in their paper or even, at least at first lecture, they might
deny such propositions. Furthermore, we choose not to not display the whole
axiomatic characterization for each ranking of the literature but we focus on
some major ones, mostly, those that generated new ideas in the literature and
structured the latter. Proofs are given in originate paper.
1To our knowledge, there does not exist any specific survey on the freedom of choice
literature. For a general survey on the rankings of opportunity sets, see Barbera´, Bossert
and Pattanaik (2001). For a critical presentation of the freedom of choice literature, see
Bavetta (1995), (2004). For a survey of a close literature, see Peragine (1999) .
2This can be, for instance, made for inequality indices. We can easily compare on a table
indices respecting axiom of α-invariance with those respecting λ-invariance. The interpre-
tation is then straightforward.
3See, for instance, the discussion of the concept of freedom under the cardinal ranking
by I. Carter (2004).
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The richness of this literature yields to distinctions between different no-
tions of freedom, nay between different notions of freedom of choice. Besides,
some rankings do not concern just one specific prudential value but combine
several values, inducing individual overall well-being rankings.
In the first part, we focus on rankings capturing freedom as such (section
2). Though this work should not be taken as a typology of all different concep-
tions of freedom. Indeed, the chosen framework restricts the scope of possible
meanings. On the one side, as we focus on individual rankings only, we can-
not discuss the social aspects of freedom (See Bavetta (2004), Carter (2004),
Oppenheim (1995), (2004)). On the other side, as we focus on opportunity
sets, we cannot discuss political liberties or freedom of the will (See Hayek
(1960: 11–21)). We will distinguish between freedom of choice as opportunity,
freedom of choice as autonomy, the valuation of exercise of choice, negative
freedom, positive freedom, and utility.
In the second part of the paper, freedom becomes an input for the obtained
rankings. These could then be interpreted as rankings capturing individual
overall well-being or a pluralist value (section 3). By pluralist value, we mean
that it is a value based on several prudential values, focusing here on freedom
of choice and utility. This means that the rankings do capture both values si-
multaneously. We will distinguish different forms of commensurability between
these two values: weighting values, trumping, equal consideration of different
values, and discontinuity.
2 Freedom rankings of opportunity sets
Most rankings of opportunity sets pretend – and actually correspond – to
some judgements according to freedom of choice. But we here claim this could
actually be more specified: freedom of choice is not a narrow concept, it does
allow many different meanings such as an opportunity conception of freedom
– freedom as scope of choice or autonomy – or an exercice conception – the
valuation of exercice of choice per se. Besides, we will notice that freedom of
choice is not the only prudential value likely to be captured through rankings
of opportunity sets. Distinct noticeable concepts of freedom or other values are
also represented in this literature, such as negative freedom, positive freedom
or utility. I do not present each prudential value in details, I rather show how
the formal framework and the specific characterization shape the concept and
define a particular meaning of freedom of choice or other values.
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2.1 The scope of choice and freedom of choice
The ‘freedom of choice literature’ was basically initiated by the seminal article
of P. Pattanaik and of Y. Xu (1990), published in Recherches E´conomiques de
Louvain: ‘On ranking opportunity sets in terms of freedom of choice’. The
idea of freedom of choice is captured by the combination of three conditions:
indifference to no-choice situations, independence and simple monotonicity.
A way to express the value of freedom of choice is to value the fact that
there is choice (See Carter (2004: 72)). Presenting no-choice situations is likely
to capture the idea of no-choice.There is indeed no reason why one singleton
would provide more choice than another singleton as far as there is no choice
in each. Here the difference between ranking according to choice or freedom
of choice on the one side and utility on the other side is made very clear.
If utility was at stake, the two singletons would not be indifferent but their
ranking would be based on the preference of the options.
Condition 1 (Indifference between no-choice situations) ∀x, y ∈ X,
{x} ∼ {y}.
Besides, the intrinsic importance of freedom of choice, rather than its in-
strumental value, is defined by Ian Carter (1999: 41) in following terms: ‘One
phenomenon X has an intrinsic value if and only if X is one end in itself, i.e.,
if X has a positive total value which is not not reducible with the value of any
other phenomenon’. He proposes a test to determine whether or not an intrin-
sic importance to freedom of choice is expressed in some judgment. Let two
situations S1 and S2. S2 is composed by the options contained in S1 and eight
others. The preferred options are already included in S1. One eventually must
choose only one option. Which of the two sets seem to be more valuable? If I
find S2 more valuable, freedom has an intrinsic importance to me. In indeed
find valuable options that I will choose but also the others: I therefore find
valuable to be able to push back the nine other options. These nine ‘not’ gives
a direction to my life, they reveal my identity through the actual choices in my
life. More choice is thus always considered better than less choice, whatever
the options. The valuation of ‘more choice’ or ‘more freedom of choice’ per se
then requires a strict monotonicity condition.
Condition 2 (Strict monotonicity) ∀x, y ∈ X, x 6= y, {x, y} Â {y}.
A third condition is necessary to induce a ranking. Pattanaik and Xu
propose an independence condition, requiring that it A and B are two possible
5
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available sets and if x does not belong either to A or to B, then the ranking
of A and B in terms of freedom4 corresponds to the ranking of A ∪ {x} and
B ∪ {x}.
Condition 3 (Independence) ∀A,B ∈ Π(X),∀x ∈ X(A ∪B),
[A º B if and only if A ∪ {x} º B ∪ {x}].
According to the cardinal ranking5, the more options in a set, the more
choice is provided by the set. The scope of choice is simply assessed by counting
the number of options contained in the set.
Rule 1 (Cardinal ranking) For all A,B ∈ Π(X), A º B if and only if
#A > #B.
Proposition 1 (Pattanaik et Xu (1990)) Preorder º satisfies simple mono-
tonicity (condition 2), indifference between no choice situations (condition 1)
and independence (condition 3) if and only if º is the cardinal ranking.
The cardinal ranking is characterized by conditions capturing the ideas
of freedom, choice and freedom of choice. Nevertheless, the simpleness of this
results gave rise to many constructive critics and, eventually, to many sophisti-
cated formulations of the expression of freedom. Two papers, written in direct
reaction to Pattanaik and Xu (1990)’s proposition, had considerable impor-
tance to renew the view about freedom. Clemens Puppe (1995)[33] raised the
problem of incompatibility of valuing utility and freedom meanwhile which
gave birth to discussions about the role of utility. Such discussions eventually
lead to the consideration of reasonable preferences trough valuation of auton-
omy and to the literature on global well-being based on several prudential
values. Besides, Marlhies Klemish-Alhert (1993) put into light the importance
of diversity in valuing choice.
2.2 Reasonable preferences and autonomy
An individual is autonomous if she makes choices entirely according to her
will, meaning independently of her conditionings or other people’s will.
P. Jones and R. Sugden (1982) raise a tension between the economic theory
of choice according to which the preferences are given, such as the standard
4The fact that this version of the independence condition captures the idea of freedom
of choice is controversial. See Carter (2004).
5For a presentation and justification of such a rule, see Jones et Sugden (1982), Sen
(1985), and van Hees (1998).
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framework of microeconomic and the valuation of autonomy. Let’s take the
standard representation of choice in economics, relying on the strong model of
preferences (see below). Whenever Mister A chooses x rather than y among
the opportunity set {x, y}, he reveals he does prefers x rather than y. For
mister A’s given preferences, x is a better option. Let’s now imagine a second
case : mister A is given the option x from the opportunity set {x, y} by force,
coercion, pity, in each case, without even asking him what he desired. Mister A
derives the exact same satisfaction in both cases since he will anyways get his
preferred option. Jones and Sugden (1982: 59) therefore propose to challenge
the assumption of given preferences to avoid this annoying consequence.
‘To suppose that the act of choice requires the exercise of mental
powers is to suppose that the chooser is in some considerable mea-
sure an autonomous agent; whatever he chooses, he might have
chosen something else. There is a tension between those and the
idea implied in the economic theory of choice, that preferences are
given. What makes significant choice possible is that preferences
are not just part of a person’s physiology or psychology like the
color of his eyes or a tendency to depression. [...] The concept of
significant choice can best be understood by considering the vari-
ous preferences that a person might have, rather than merely the
preferences that he actually reveals when he finally makes a choice.’
Preferences do only catch the idea of the satisfaction he could get from dif-
ferent options, whatever chosen or imposed. Their account is then not likely
to capture the idea of autonomy. In the example, Mister A is definitely more
autonomous in the first case than in the second one. His choice is indeed au-
tonomous if he chooses something while he could have chosen something else.
He is autonomous if his preference relation could actually have been differ-
ent. The account for other possible preferences excludes the cases where he
is obliged to get his actual preferred option. Therefore, the introduction of a
wide scope of possible preferences in the assessment of opportunity sets, which
we will now call ‘reasonable preferences’, allows to capture the idea of auton-
omy: the wider the range of reasonably chosen options from an opportunity
set is, the more autonomous the person who faces it is.
Following Jones and Sugden (1982) and Puppe (1998), the options that are
likely to be chosen, according to reasonable preferences6, will be called essential
6Let’s remark it is equivalent, in the opportunity set framework, to think in terms of
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options. Denote E(A) the subset of essential alternatives from the set A. This
also means that an option is essential if extracting it from the set strictly
decrease the freedom derived from a set: E(A) := {x ∈ A : A Â A\{x}}.
On the contrary, an option is ineligible if it could never be chosen, e.g.
by any reasonable preference. The fact that certain option may never be
chosen have an important consequence on the formulation of monotonicity
condition. If you add another option to a set, you can no longer consider that
autonomy is raised no matter what option it is. Another option will never
decrease the autonomy provided by the set, but it is likely not to raise it if it is
ineligible. Therefore, while we had justified the appeal to a strict monotonicity
condition for the choice ranking, the autonomy ranking should respect a weak
monotonicity condition.
Condition 4 (Weak monotonicity) For all x, y ∈ X, {x, y} º {x}.
The weak monotonicity condition is actually a very strong weakening, while
all that is necessary here is just a ‘conditional’ monotonicity: it is juste in case
the new option is likely to be chosen that is is likely to raise autonomy. Indeed,
the kind of further alternatives likely to raise the autonomy derived from a set
has to be specified. Another monotonicity condition, called I-monotonicity and
proposed by Pattanaik and Xu (1998), captures the idea according to which
only essential alternatives may increase the autonomy provided by an oppor-
tunity set. Let’s first introduce some notations. Considering all reasonable
preferences to identify the best elements, for all x ∈ X and all A ∈ Z, x[I]A if
and only if max(A∪{x}) = A∪{x}; x[P]A if an only if {x} = max(A∪{x});
A[P]x if and only if x /∈ max(A ∪ {x}).
Condition 5 ((I)-monotonicity) For all A,B ∈ Π(X), and for all x ∈
X \ A, (x[I]A and A º B) implies [A ∪ {x} Â B].
The assessment of autonomy will be different according to whether a broad
range of possible preferences is considered as reasonable or very few of them.
There are two kinds of differences : on the nature of restrictions of the set of
possible preferences to a set of reasonable preferences on the one hand, on the
design of such restrictions on the other hand.
possibly chosen option in a set or in term of possible preference. As a matter of fact,
all options are considered at first to pick one single option subsequently, option that is
the best element according to a preference relation. If there are several possible preference
relations, there might be several possible chosen options. Henceforth, we will considered that
preference relations differ at least on their best elements to make the reasoning perfectly
equivalent.
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2.2.1 All rational preferences are reasonable: Valuing the scope of
choice
To one extreme, all possible rational preference may be considered as reason-
able. Even very odd and eccentric preferences should be accepted as reason-
able. J. S. Mill (1859: 83) for instance would defend this idea according to
which there is no justification to restrict the scope of reasonable preferences.
Therefore, each option from a set is essential, no matter which it is. The re-
quired monotonicity condition here is therefore exactly equivalent to the strict
monotonicity condition 2. We are then brought back to the cardinal ranking
of the opportunity sets, e.i. to Pattanaik and Xu (1990)’s result.
2.2.2 Just one preference ordering is reasonable: Valuing indirect
utility
To an other extreme, if just one preference is considered as reasonable, the
actual individual preference, then we are back to the traditional rule based on
the comparison of indirect utilities.
Rule 2 For all A,B ∈ Π(X), A º B if an only if [max(A)Rmax(B)].
2.2.3 Some preferences are reasonable, some are not: Valuing au-
tonomy
Restrictions on the family of the acceptable preferences may be justified. For
instance, we could claim that no reasonable person may ever consider that
being beheaded at dawn is an essential option. Though to our knowledge not
much in the freedom of choice literature describes formally these different kinds
of preferences. Rather, we focus on the design of the restriction, specifying
whether or not the fact that an option is essential is given, thus capturing
different conceptions of autonomy. We display the rule based on the cardinality
of essential options, on the cardinality of essential options weighted by ineligible
options, then the lexicographic version of these rules.
Simple cardinality of essential options If, for all reasonable preferences,
x is strictly worse than at least one option from A, e.g if x is ineligible, then
adding x to A does not raise autonomy.
Condition 6 (Type 1 irrelevance of dominated alternatives) For all A,B ∈
Π(X) and for all x ∈ X, if A[P]x, then [A º B if and only if A ∪ {x} º B]
and [B º A if and only if B º A ∪ {x}].
9
Conceptions of freedom and ranking opportunity sets. A typology
The basic composition condition, corresponding to an extension of the in-
dependence condition to inclusions of any sets rather than a singleton, is the
following: for all A,B,C ∈ Π(X), we have : A ∼ A ∪ B implies that, for
all C,A ∪ C ∼ A ∪ B ∪ C. If A º B and C º D, we could expect that
A ∪ C º B ∪D. This formulation is not used in this setting for it is likely to
induce counter-examples. If A and C share too numerous common elements,
it is possible than B ∪D provides less freedom nevertheless. The composition
condition proposed by Sen (1991) is designed to avoid this annoying conse-
quence : we further assume that the sets do not have common elements, e.g.
A ∩ C = B ∩ D = ∅. But even this new formulation is likely to induce
counter-examples in this settings for some alternatives from the sets could be
ineligible. The specific composition condition proposed by Pattanaik and Xu
(1998) requires then that each distinct alternative from a set is an essential
alternative.
Condition 7 (Composition) For all A,B,C,D ∈ Π(X), such that
(A ∩ C = B ∩D = ∅, and max(A ∪ C) = A ∪ C, and max(B ∪D) = B ∪D)[A º
B and C º D] implies [A ∪ C º B ∪ D], and [A º B and C Â D] implies
[A ∪ C Â B ∪D].
Cardinal ranking of essential alternatives compares opportunity sets ac-
cording to the number of essential alternatives in the sets.
Rule 3 (Cardinal ranking of essential alternatives) For all
A,B ∈ Π(X), [A º B if and only if #max(A) > #max(B)] , where #max(A)
stands for the number of time a reasonable preference considers an element
from A is optimal.
Proposition 2 (Pattanaik et Xu (1998)) The relation º satisfies indif-
ference between no choice situations (condition 1), I-monotonicity (condition
5), type 1 irrelevance of dominated alternatives (condition 6), and composition
(condition 7) if and only if º is the cardinal ranking of essential alternatives.
Let’s take the following example. We consider two sets: A = {x, y} and
B = {z, w} and two possible reasonable orderings of preferences: xPyPzPw
and yP′xP′wP′z. Therefore, the set of essential elements from A is {x, y}
and from B is {z, w}. In both cases, the cardinal of essential elements is the
same, which induces that they provide exactly the same autonomy according
to the rule 3. It is quite difficult to swallow when considering than a reasonable
person would never choose an option from B if he was given the choice to pick
10
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one from A as well. Intuitively, the fact that some elements are more likely to
be chosen is important, not just the fact that they are likely to be chosen in
some set.
Weighted cardinality rule of essential options Another form of restric-
tion consists in taking into account the role of ineligible actions in the set.
We first formulate dominance and non-dominance conditions in a similar
framework.
Condition 8 (Simple non-dominance) For all x, y ∈ X, if x[I]y, then
{x} ∼ {y}.
Condition 9 (Simple dominance) For all x, y ∈ X, if x[P ]y, then {x} Â
{y}.
If, for all reasonable preferences, x is strictly worse than at least one option
from A, i.e. if x is ineligible, then the status of the set B ∩ {x} vis-a`-vis A
should not be better nor worse that the status of B vis-a`-vis A.
Condition 10 (Type 2 irrelevance of dominated alternatives) For all
A,B ∈ Π(X) and for all x ∈ X, if A[P]x, then [A º B if and only if
A º B ∪ {x}] and [B º A if and only if B ∪ {x} º A].
A weaker composition condition adds some further conditions to the com-
position condition 7: every alternative from A ∩ D can be considered by a
reasonable person to be at least as good as all alternatives in A∩D, and every
alternative in B ∩ C can be considered by a reasonable person to be at least
as good as all alternatives in B ∩ C.
Condition 11 (Weak composition) For all A,B,C,D ∈ Π(X), such that
(A ∩ C = B ∩ D = ∅, and max(A ∪ C) = A ∪ C, and max(A ∪ D) = A ∪
D, and max(B∪C) = B∪C, and max(B∪D) = B∪D), [A º B and C º D]
implies [A ∪ C º A ∪D], and [A º B and C Â D] implies [A ∪ C Â B ∪D].
Let AB refers for all elements a ∈ A such that reasonable person may never
consider a to be at least as good as all the elements of B. Of course, these
elements are not necessarily identical with BA. P. Pattanaik and Y. Xu (1998)
characterize a weighted cardinality rule of essential options. In this ranking of
different sets, what is at stake is not just the number of essential alternatives
in each sets but also the fact that these sets lead to valuable choices.
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Rule 4 (Weighted cardinal ranking of essential alternatives) For all
A,B ∈ Π(X), [A º B if and only if #[max(A)− AB] > [#max(B)−BA]].
Proposition 3 (Pattanaik et Xu (1998)) The relation º satisfies simple
dominance (condition 9), simple non-dominance (condition 8), I-monotonicity
(condition 5), type 1 irrelevance of dominated alternatives (condition 6), type
2 irrelevance of dominated alternatives (condition 10) and weak composition
(condition 11) if and only if º is the weighted cardinal ranking of essential
alternatives.
Lexicographic version of the cardinality rule Another way to avoid the
problem raised by the example displayed above is given by the lexicographic
approach of the cardinal ranking. For instance, situations where some state-
newspapers are available may still sound better than one with some free-press
available. Romero-Medina (2001: 185) propose to ‘sequentially remove the first
element in all the reasonable persons’ preferences and compare the available
sets of newspapers according to this new set of preferences. This new reference
set where alternatives are sequentially eliminated [...] is a compromised idea
of freedom that can only be justified when the set of reasonable preferences
cannot discriminate’.
2.3 Diversity and exercice of significant choices
The independence condition (see condition 3) used in the cardinal ranking
(rule 1) is likely to raise some problems, well illustrated by this example (see
Pattanaik et Xu (1990: 389)).
Let’s take the following universal set of options: {train, car 1, car 2}.
By indifference, we get: {train} ∼ {car 1}. By independence, we then get:
{train, car 2} ∼ {car 1, car 2}, meaning that these two sets offers exactly the
same freedom of choice. Appealing to intuition, this result raises substantial
problems. The first set allows for a choice among a wide scope of diverse
transportation modes. The choice of options among the first set is then harder
and more substantial because choosing train rather than car expresses the kind
of life you decided to lead. In the second set, the act of choosing just exercises
on the kind of car, e.g. the color of the car, which is less significant. If we
imagine that this second car is exactly similar in brand, type, series, color...,
this result is even more annoying. It does contradict with the idea of valuing
for themselves significant choices. To express through the ranking of sets the
12
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idea of significant choices, the independence condition has to be weakened so
that diversity or similarity of options are now taken into account.
Speaking of significant choices refer to two kinds of situations: according to
P. Jones and R. Sugden (1982, p. 57), ‘an option is not significant in relation
to a choice set if it is either indistinguishable from another option or ineligible.’
We choose here to save the expression of ‘significant choice’ for the first case :
making a choice between indistinguishable options is not significant. The more
diverse the options in the set, the more significant is the choice of options from
the set. Indeed, diversity induces a harder choice, meaning the exercise of
choice is more meaningful. J. S. Mill values significant choices and, through
it, the exercise of choice in itself, whichever it is. It is through the act of
choice that human faculties are developing: ‘The human faculties of perception,
judgment, discriminative feeling, mental activity, and even moral preference,
are exercised only in making a choice. [...] The mental and moral, like the
muscular powers, are improved only by being used’ (Mill (1859: 74-75)). And
these faculties are one of the elements of well-being (see Mill (1859: 72)).
Therefore, the issue at stake becomes the way to introduce the notion of
similarity or diversity of options. Of course, this requires at least to give some
more information about these options. But as far as indifference condition
is not challenged at this point (See below), wide information to describe the
option, e.g. the attributes of options, is not necessary. The only required
information concerns exclusively whether or not options are similar, or, at
most, how diverse they are. This will affect the very definition of monotonicity,
in the same way that the account for reasonable preferences affected autonomy
orderings, as well as the formulation of indifference as well. Note that some
propositions (See Rosenbaum (2000), Nehring and Puppe (2002)) use more
information than necessary for this specific purpose, describing the attributes
of the options. It actually mean they endorse another notion of freedom as
well, that we will present below.
Different ways are explored to characterize similarity of options: either we
focus on the set in itself; either we focus on the options themselves. In the first
case, the diversity of the set depends on its extreme options. In the second
case, each option from the set is considered as likely to be similar or not (binary
or vague judgments of similarity), nay more or less similar (cardinal or ordinal
degrees of similarity).
13
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2.3.1 Extreme alternatives
A first way to take into account diversity is to focus on the most extreme
alternatives in the opportunity set.
M. Klemish-Alhert (1993) represents opportunity sets as convex hulls in
the space of universal set of goods. The conditions used to compare sets are
re-expressed in this framework. Convex hull monotonicity for instance is a
condition allowing to value the scope of alternatives in the hull. This hull will
be larger if its boundary alternatives will be far from one another.
E. Rosenbaum (2000) assesses freedom of choice from the scope of choices
according to certain characteristics, requiring a wide amount of information
at this point. Formally, freedom of choice is a function of the mathematical
distance between extreme points in the space of characteristics. The more dis-
tinct these characteristics, the more free the individual facing the set. If some
characteristic reveal more important than others, this unequal importance is
expressed by unequal weight for this characteristic.
We are then led to focus on the extreme positions. M. Klemish-Alhert
(1993: 197) finds this result controversial because it is likely to induce undesir-
able consequences. For instance, enjoying freedom in a country where it is just
allowed to express extreme opinions will be considered, in this framework, as
more valuable than in any country where all opinions can be expressed except
extreme ones. To avoid these counter-intuitive consequences, it seems inter-
esting to take into account how each option contribute to the diversity of the
set, rather than focusing on extreme options.
2.3.2 Binary judgements of similarity
Diversity or similarity of options can be just a question of binary judgments :
either two options are similar, either they are not.
P. Pattanaik and Y. Xu (2000) introduce on a similarity relation, written
S, and defined over X is reflexive and symmetric (but not supposed transitive).
We read xSy as: ‘x is similar to y’ and ¬xSy as: ‘x is not similar to y’. For
all A ∈ Π(X), we say that A is homogeneous if and only if, for all a, a′ ∈ A,
a′Sa. For all A ∈ Π(X), a similarity based partition of A is defined as a
class {A1, ..., Am} such that: (1) A1, ..., Am are all non-empty subsets of A;
(2) A1 ∪ ... ∪ Am = A; (3) AA, ..., Am are pairwise disjoint; and (4) for all
k ∈ {1, ..; ,m}, Ak is homogeneous. The similarity based partition will be
denoted by φ(A), φ′(A), φ”(A), etc.
Monotonicity and composition are re-formulated in this new setting.
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Condition 12 (S-monotonicity) For all A ∈ Π(X) such that A just con-
tains similar alternatives according to S, and, for all x ∈ X \ A, [xSA ⇒
A ∪ {x} ∼ A] and [¬xSA⇒ A ∪ {x} Â A].
Condition 13 (S-composition) For all A,B,C,D ∈ Π(X), if [A ∪ C =
B∪D = ∅, C and D contains similar alternatives, and C is not similar to A],
then [(A º B and C º D) implies A ∪ C º B ∪D] and [(A Â B and C Â D)
implies A ∪ C Â B ∪D].
Under the simple similarity based rule, opportunity sets are ranked according
to the cardinalities of their smallest similarity-based partitions.
Rule 5 (Simple similarity based ordering) For all
A,B ∈ Π(X), A º#S B if and only if #φ(A) ≥ #φ(B).
Proposition 4 (Pattanaik and Xu (2000)) º satisfies indiffe´rence between
no-choice situations (condition 1), S-monotonie (condition 12) and S-composition
(condition 13) if and only if º is the simple similarity based ordering.
This result answers the objection raised against the cardinal ordering, in
which freedom of choice is growing even in the case clones are added to existing
alternatives.
2.3.3 Approximations of similarity
It might be difficult to definitely hold that ‘alternatives are similar’ or ‘they
are not’. S. Bavetta and M. Del Seta (2001) use the concept of rough ap-
proximations of the sets . They consider, in the universal set of options, first,
the inner (or lower) set of options that is just composed by similar options,
and second, the outer (or upper) set of options, whose complement do not
include any options that are similar to options from the set. This induces two
kinds of possible orderings, based on the cardinality of each of these rough
approximations of the sets.
2.3.4 Assessing degrees of similarity
Next step is taking into account degrees of similarity rather than binary judge-
ments about similarity. M. van Hees (2004) raises a problem linked with this
ambition. He establishes that the characterization of similarity based orderings
is often impossible because of the definition of distance between alternatives
and sets.
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S. Bervoets and N. Gravel (2003) propose an opportunity sets ordering
based on an ordinal notion of diversity, when W. Bossert, P. Pattanaik and
Y. Xu (2002) propose a cardinal approach of diversity. The study of bio-
diversity, run by K. Nehring and C. Puppe (2002), illustrates another way
to take into account the problem of diversity, considering the diversity of at-
tributes characterizing options.
Another way to capture the valuation of diversity is proposed by F. Gaspart
and myself (2005)[3]. They observe that it is easy to choose between these two
alternatives: working and be well-paid on the one side and not-working and
starving on the other side. But is is not as easy to choose between these two
ones: working and be paid, not working and be a little paid. In the second
opportunity set, exercising a choice identifies the kind of life the person is
really valuing while a reasonable person is more likely to just reveal she does
want to starve in the first one. A. Baujard and F. Gaspart capture the idea
of valuing hard choice in particular through a specific trade-off between utility
and choice. Diversity is taken into account from a trigger value where utility
and diversity seem indifferent.
2.4 Identifying constraints and negative freedom
Freedom is about the absence of constraints. Different conceptions of freedom
corresponds to the focus on different kinds of constraints. ‘Negative freedom’
refers to the absence of coercion (See I. Berlin (1969)). As a relational concept,
freedom is defined relatively to the constraints that other individuals impose
to individual choices. It is a space in which individual can act and choose
without being prevented by others. In this sense, freedom, or unfreedom,
does not depend on self-abilities of the individual to do what he wants, but
on other people’s intentional meddling, coercion or oppression. Measuring
negative freedom supposes to measure the absence of this kind of constraints,
rather than any other constraints. The more preventions there are, the less
freedom.
If freedom were to be defined by this only criterium, then, two situations
would be indifferent if there were no coercion in both but many available
options in the first one when just one option is available in the second one. As
a counterpoint to this, freedom is higher when non-prevented opportunities are
more numerous. Measuring negative freedom therefore has then two aspects:
the identification of the origin of constraints and the situation of opportunity.
Constraints may be of different kinds. An action is an opportunity if it is
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doable. But the reason why it is doable is not just that there is no coercion
against it realization. Twenty years ago, people were not prevented from using
cellular phones but they did not and could not use them because it was just
technologically impossible. This opportunity did not exist. This non-existence
did not affect negative freedom but the actual ability to use the cellular phone.
It sounds very clarifying to actually distinguish between different kinds of con-
straints to focus on the negative aspect of freedom when assessing opportunity
sets, e.g. firstly, technical or social constraints, and, secondly, external con-
straints.
Following van Hees (1998)[42], an opportunity situation consists of the
ordered pair of a feasible set and an opportunity set, (A,G), describing the
set of actions A doable from the fact that there exists an adapted technology,
and the opportunity set G composed by actions that nobody is preventing us
from doing by coercion, and that we will call by the general term ‘external
constraints’.
2.4.1 External constraints and negative freedom
In a first approach, we focus on the external constraints, considering all actions
are possible, as far as technological possibilities are concerned. The basic con-
ditions to capture the idea of freedom are then re-formulated in the framework
of opportunity situations.
Condition 14 (Strict monotonicity) ∀x, y ∈ A, x 6= y, (A, {x, y}) Â (A, {y}).
Condition 15 (Indifference between no-choice situations) ∀x, y ∈ A,
(A, {x}) ∼ (A, {y}).
The next condition capture the role of external constraints in the definition of
negative freedom. A person’s negative freedom depends on the things she is
not free to choose. A situation in which an option has become technologically
feasible and can be chosen without constraints yields the same amount of
freedom as the one in which it was not yet feasible. In others words, as soon
as there is not further external constraints, there is no reason why negative
freedom should change.
Condition 16 (Immunity to opportunities deriving from new technology)
∀G ∈ Π(X) et ∀x ∈ X : (A,G) ∼ (A ∪ {x}, G ∪ {x}).
Rule 6 (Constraints-based cardinality ordering) (A,G) º (B,F ) if and
only if #(B − F ) > #(A−G).
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According to the constraints based cardinality quasi-ordering, the less external
constraints to realize technically possible actions, the more free.
Proposition 5 (Van Hees (1998)) Preorder º satisfies indifference between
no-choice situations (condition 15), strict monotonicity (condition 14), and
immunity to opportunities deriving from new technology (condition 16) if and
only if º is the constraints based cardinality quasi-ordering.
2.4.2 Technological constraints and negative freedom
Even though technological constraints may be independent from external con-
straints, they may affect the actual negative freedom derived from an oppor-
tunity situations. As a matter of fact, if some new technology now exist but
if it does not change the opportunity set, then the freedom derived from the
set is reduced. Innovations are likely to increase freedom to the only condition
that it is available to the person.
Condition 17 (Decreasing with new technology) ∀G ∈ Π(X) and ∀x ∈
X − A : (A,G) Â (A ∪ {x}, G).
As in condition 16, both the feasible set and the opportunity set is changing.
The opportunity situation resulting from the combination of two should be
ranked exactly in between the two situations of which it is the combination.
This captures the fact that the increase in available options does not necessarily
outweigh the increase in the number of forbidden options.
Condition 18 (Independence with variable technology) If A and B are
disjoint, then ∀G,F ∈ Π(X) :
(A,G) ∼ (B,F )⇒ (A,G) ∼ (A ∪B,G ∪ F ) ∼ (B,F )
and (A,G) Â (B,F )⇒ (A,G) Â (A ∪B,G ∪ F ) Â (B,F ).
Condition 19 generalize indifference between no-choice situations by consider-
ing both the feasible set and the opportunity set rather than just the allowed
alternatives.
Condition 19 (Neutrality to any permutation) ∀G ∈ Π(X) and for any
permutation pi of X, (A,G) ∼ (piA, piG), where piA and piG stand for the
images of A and G under pi, respectively.
The ordering proposed by Steiner (1983) depends, not any more on the
difference, but on the ratio between opportunity set cardinality sets of doable
actions.
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Rule 7 (Steiner’s ordering) (A,E) º∗ (B,F ) if and only if #E
#A
> #F
#B
.
When technological innovations increase opportunity set, freedom is increasing.
Proposition 6 (Van Hees (1998)) Preorder º satisfies decreasing with new
technology (condition 17), independence with variable technology (condition
18), and neutrality to any permutation (condition 19) if and only if º is the
Steiner’s ordering.
2.5 Concluding remarks about freedom rankings
We have displayed rankings of opportunity sets according to different notions
of freedom: freedom of choice, freedom as autonomy, freedom as the valuation
of exercise of choice, negative freedom. If there were some unity in the frame-
work freedom of choice literature is based on, one could considers the specific
role of each axiom to capture a specific meaning of freedom. As this is not
the case, such an analysis would not be true for every single contributions. It
would be nevertheless interesting to present such an analysis, which remains
true at least for most contributions. The seminal paper by Pattanaik and Xu
(1990) captures some confusing idea of freedom of choice by valuing the scope
of choice, where indifference between no choice situations, strict monotonicity
and independence hold. Most contributions are then organized as a discussion
of this first framework. When strict monotonicity is questioned and replaced
by some conditional monotonicity, paying attention to reasonable preferences
rather than actual preferences, autonomy is at stake. When independence
is questioned, it becomes possible to take into account diversity and value
significant choices per se. When indifference between no choice situations is
questioned, we mean that two situations with no choice might not be compa-
rable. Their comparison could depend on the actual constraints in cause. It is
necessary to capture the idea of negative freedom.
Two other kinds of rankings could be added to this list: rankings accord-
ing to positive freedom and rankings according to utility. Positive freedom is
opposed to negative freedom (See Berlin (1969)). It is not any more so im-
portant to identify the kind of constraints to do any actions. On the contrary,
the substantial part of freedom stands in the actual possibility or impossibil-
ity to do them. The ordering of opportunity sets of options to capture the
idea of actual freedom is to be distinguished from those to capture the idea of
freedom of choice. On the one side, indifference condition, that was a relevant
requirement for freedom of choice per se, raises in itself a disturbing problem.
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With indifference, we should consider : { education } ∼ { a glass of champagne
}. Yet, the first option is driving to many different, valuable, and lasting op-
portunities (such as jobs and consumption going along, pleasure derived from
culture...), while the second one provides a short time of pleasure and does not
open, eventually, many other opportunities. In other words, to speak about
actual freedoms, it is important to give up the assumption, imposed by condi-
tion 1, according to which options are considered all homogeneous. Two ways
are then possible to differentiate between options. The first way consists in
considering the actual utility or welfare in general provided by each options
(See Sen (1990: 470)). In this case, the obtained ranking captures the idea
of utility or global well-being displayed below. The second way consists in
considering that freedom derives from the number of actions that are even-
tually possible to achieve (See Carter (1999)): the idea of overall freedom is
expressed in this case. On the other side, it is important to incorporate the im-
pact of the constraints on the ability to take advantages of the options. People
are not prevented by anyone to buy some expensive jewelry place Vendoˆme,
but most of them could never afford it, even though they would invest their
whole budget in it. It reveals important to describe the systems of constraints,
whatever their nature, limiting the scope of doable actions. This requires to
give up the independence condition. Besides, ‘McEnroe and Becker playing
together can both win, but not all together; they do not have the collective
freedom to both win the match’ (See Carter (1999: 258)). It is then impor-
tant to take into account the system of individual interactions affecting this
actual freedom. Thus positive freedom could be captured in ranking opportu-
nity sets with some alteration of indifference between no choice situation and
independence conditions, and by considering the system of interaction with
other people.
How could be captured the idea of utility in an ranking of opportunity set?
This is certainly not straightforward. According to the experience requirement
(see Glover (1977)[15], Griffin (1986), Haslett (1990)), an individual should
experience the utility of options, while he will just experience one option among
the set. If this model of utility is retained, this means that an opportunity set
is not an object of utility in itself, it can just be the object of indirect utility.
So if the retained criterium to rank the sets is utility, what we will be studying
is the indirect utility of opportunity sets. In a narrow welfarist point of view,
choice has no intrinsic value. Comparing two sets amounts to comparing the
utility of the sets, which is captured by the dominance condition:
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Condition 20 (Simple dominance) For all x, y ∈ X, if xPy, then {x} Â
{y}
Besides, the weak monotonicity condition, without any condition, has to ap-
ply. The indirect utility derived from the set will depend on the satisfaction
the chosen option will provide. We then have to imagine which option might
be chosen from the set. The description of the ranking will depend on the
relevant preference relation: the actual preference relation when it is known
and posted, the probable preference relations when they are flexible. When
preferences are given, the ranking of best elements capture the idea of util-
ity of an opportunity sets. When preferences are risky, there is no unique
individual preference relation. Individual preferences depend on a parameter
whose probability distribution is well-known. K. Arrow (1995) proposes an
ordering based on this principle7. When preferences are uncertain, D. Kreps
(1979) proposes a ranking that captures the idea of preference for flexibility,
by valuing indirect utility. The maximal elements of the sets according to each
preference (or utility function) is the only important information to compare
sets. Of course, if the possible preferences are now interpreted as reasonable
preferences an individual may have – rather that actual preferences an indi-
vidual is likely to have –, the right interpretation of the obtained ordering
does not concern flexibility and indirect utility but autonomy, as we have seen
above. Thus to capture the idea of utility of opportunity sets, at least weak
monotonicity and dominance should hold.
3 Freedom as a component of value ranking
We have presented above different rankings of opportunity sets according to
some specific and unique prudential value, which was freedom. We now turn
on the consideration of several values at a time. Freedom becomes now in
ingredient between others to be captured through the ranking, and not the
main interpretative content of the ranking. Several interpretations can be
attributed to such rankings. It could merely be a ranking capturing “what
is of value” in a specific situation. It could also capture some idea of global
well-being. The objective of constructing global well-being rankings indeed
requires this process of combination of different values in a single ranking (See
Griffin (1986) for a thorough discussion of well-being and its determinants).
7It is interesting to note there is no need here to use a different framework than the
traditional microeconomic framework for utility.
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The values are stake could be either of the ones we displayed above. We will
though focus on freedom of choice and utility, as these are more represented
in the literature. The differences between the rankings of global well-being
therefore do not stand in the ‘ingredients” but rather on the kind of retained
combination, namely the nature of commensurability between the values (See
Griffin (1986: 75-92)): weighting values, lexical order of the values, equal
consideration of different values, or discontinuity.
3.1 Weighting values
Weighting values supposes that a trade-off between values is meaningful and
possible. There therefore exists a common scale for values. In others words, a
superior value constitutes the common scale based on the different prudential
values to judge the situations. This one value may be called well-being or
utility (See Mill (1866: book VI, ch. XII, § 7)). Judgements based on weight-
ing different values are then eventually welfarist, though utility taken as the
satisfaction of preferences might not be the only value at stake. That is the
reason why we will rather use the term ‘global well-being’: global well-being
is the substantial value depending both on utility and freedom of choice.
There is two ways to express this actual welfarism: either the two values
are linked by utility, either the only information at stake from each situation
is utility.
3.1.1 Values bound to utility
C. Puppe (1996) suggests to take into account both utility, through mono-
tonicity with respect to set inclusion (condition 4) and independance of non-
essential alternatives (condition 21) and freedom of choice, through preference
for freedom of choice (condition 22), though freedom of choice is important
only as far as it is freedom to choose useful options. Thus, even though it is
said explicitly in the paper that the two values are at stake, we claim here that
just one of them is eventually substantial: utility.
As we said and defined before, for a given situation and for given individual
preferences, a set A provides more freedom with alternative {x} if and only if
this is an essential alternative. The set of all essential alternatives of set A is
written E(A). We have : E(A) ⊇ A,∀A ∈ Π(X).
According to independence of non-essential alternatives condition, the free-
dom derived from a set just depends on its essential alternatives. It is then
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equivalent to face a set or the set of its essential alternatives. This allows to
capture the idea of domination and the importance of utility in the ranking.
Condition 21 (Independence of non-essential alternatives) ∀A ∈ Π(X),
E(A) ∼ A.
To capture the idea of valuing autonomy, we should set: ∀x ∈ A,A Â
A \ {x}. Our intuition is that, in all set, there exists at least one option
that deserves consideration : E(A) 6= ∅. In condition 22 on the contrary, A
is preferred to A \ {x} just because it includes this (at leats) one valuable
option according to the individual preference. What explains the value of set
is the value of options, rather than the structure of the set as in autonomy or
freedom of choice per se rankings. Even though this condition seems to attach
value to freedom of choice, the latter is actually just taken into account for its
contribution to indirect utility.
Condition 22 (Preference for freedom of choice) ∀A ∈ Π(X), ∃x ∈ A
such that A Â A \ {x}.
Sets including essential alternatives are preferred.
Rule 8 (Domination relation of essential alternatives) ∀A,B ∈ Π(X),
A º B if and only if E(A ∪B) ⊆ A.
Proposition 7 (Puppe (1996)) Preorder º satisfies preference for freedom
of choice (condition 22), weak monotonicity (condition 4), independence of
non-essential alternatives (condition 21) if and only if º is the domination
relation of essential alternatives.
3.1.2 A welfarist evaluation
Welfarism is the view according to which what utility is the only value of moral
importance and no others. At a technical point of view, it means that welfare
function just depends on individual utility function, or welfare rankings just
depends on individual utility consideration. Put it this way, the definition
does not suppose any specific meaning of utility. What is often at stake is
the satisfaction of actual preferences when choosing one alternative, but it can
refer to some other model of utility, where different values could be at stake
(see Griffin (1986) for instance).
W. Bossert (1997) proposes some rankings based on overall well-being8.
Different values may contribute to the level of individual well-being, such as
8It is not made any difference here between welfare and well-being.
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utility and freedom of choice. the welfarist interpretation of the generated
ranking comes from the fact that we just consider the instrumental value of
these prudential values on this wide notion of welfare, in which utility is even-
tually everything that counts.
All possible utility functions are taken into account. For each of them,
there exists a ranking of opportunity sets based on utility of the alternatives
of the set. Then, the monotonicity condition should not necessarily hold.
A minimal indifference condition rather seems more acceptable: there exists
a overall well-being function and an option, such that adding it to the set
does not necessarily increase the overall well-being derived from the set. The
relation does indeed depend on the overall well-being of the set rather than
on the utility of options. R denotes the set of all orderings on Π(X). An
opportunity set ranking rule assigns an element of R to each utility function
U ∈ U . Formally, an opportunity set ranking rule is a mapping: R : U 7→ R.
For simplicity, we will write: RU = F (U), with IU and PU for the symmetric
and asymmetric part of RU .
Condition 23 (Minimal indifference) ∃U ∈ U , x ∈ X, and y ∈ X \ {x}
such that {x, y}Iu{x}.
This condition, as the others, may be expressed with preference relations rather
than with utility functions: ∃ º and x ∈ X,Y ∈ X \ {x} such that {x, y} ∼
{x}.
It is then possible to identify the underlying utility functions to capture the
role of utility, with neutrality and extension conditions. The former reduces
information needed to rank opportunity sets to the maximal possible utility
for each set. We are then in a extended welfarist framework (capturing overall
well-being), though not really in an indirect utility framework (capturing util-
ity). Extension condition sets that rankings of set should respect individual
preferences over options when the sets are reduced to singletons. This amounts
to, though in a different framework to the simple dominance condition 30.
Condition 24 (Extension) ∃U ∈ U ,∀x, y ∈ X, {x}Ru{y},U(x) ≥ U(y).
Independence condition captures the fact that rankings of two sets remains
still if their common elements are removed from both sets. This is basically a
separability condition.
Condition 25 (Separability) ∀R ∈ ℘,∀A,B ∈ Π(X),∀x ∈ X\(A ∪ B),
ARUB ⇔ (A ∪ {x})RU(B ∪ {x}).
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W. Bossert introduces a continuity condition, interpreted as a regularity con-
dition :
Condition 26 (Regularity) ∀n ∈ N,∀u ∈ Rn,∀A,B ∈ Π(X), such that
|A| = |B| = n, the sets {v ∈ Rn | U [A] = u and U [B] = v and ARuB for some
U ∈ U} and {v ∈ Rn | U [A] = u and U [B] = v et BRuA for some U ∈ U} are
closed.
Rule 9 (Anonymous ranking of all elements from the set) There exists
a function g : R → R, and t ∈ R, such that g(t) = 0. A º B if and only if
∀n,m ∈ N,
i=n∑
i=1
g(v(Ai)) >
i=m∑
i=1
g(v(Bi)), where v(Ai) = (u(a1), ...u(ai)).
The ranking of the set is based on the sum of utilities derived from each option
included in the set.
Proposition 8 (Bossert (1997)) Preoder º satisfies minimal indifference
(condition 23), regularity (condition 26), extension (condition 24) and separa-
bility (condition 25) if and only if º is the anonymous ranking of all elements
of the set.
It is besides possible to study the impact of modifying information require-
ments of utility on these rankings. Different measuring assumptions induced
different rankings, varying along with parameters (See Bossert (1997: 107–
110)). For instance, if we assume a cardinal measurability, it is possible to
assign different weight to each option according to their desirability.
3.2 Lexical order of the values
Trumping introduces a weak form of incommensurability between values. It
allows comparability, but one value outrank the others as strongly as possible.
We then talk of lexical priority of one value over the other. All distinct value
may be assigned an intrinsic importance then, but one of them reveals more
substantial. The secondary values affects the ranking in the only case where
the first one is already satisfied. In our framework, this amounts to give a
lexical priority of utility over freedom, or on the contrary, a lexical priority of
freedom over utility.
3.2.1 Priority of utility over freedom
First, let’s express priority of utility over freedom
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Condition 27 (Indirect preference) ∀A ∈ Π(X), with #A > 1, {max(A)} Â
{A \max(A)}
The weak independence condition recalls the independence condition (condition3),
according to which the ranking of sets is the same for sets on the one side,
and these sets where we added new options. In this weaker version of inde-
pendence, we assume that this added element is not strictly preferred to any
best elements from the previous sets.
Condition 28 (Weak independence) ∀A ∈ Π(X), ∀x ∈ X\(A∪B), [max(A)Px
and max(B)Px] ⇒ [A ∪ {x} º B ∪ {x} ⇔ A º B]
With to the preference-first lexicographic relation, the sets are ordered
first by ranking their maxima according the the individual actual preference
relation. In case of ties, they are ranked according to the cardinality rule.
Rule 10 (Preference-first lexicographic relation) For all A,B ∈ Π(X),
[A º B if and only if (max(A)P max(B)) or (max(A) = max(B) and #A > #B)].
Proposition 9 (Bossert, Pattanaik and Xu (1994)) Quasi-ordering º sat-
isfies simple monotonicity (condition 31), simple indirect indifference (condi-
tion 32), weak independence (condition 28), and indirect preference (condition
27) if and only if º is the preference-first lexicographic relation.
3.2.2 Priority of freedom over utility
It is possible to capture the converse priority, where freedom of choice becomes
the prior value over utility. It is just in case the sets are indifferent in terms
of freedom that utility plays a role to order them.
Condition 29 (Simple priority to freedom) ∀ distincts x, y, z ∈ X, xPyPz ⇒
{x, z}P{x}
According to simple priority to freedom over utility condition, a set with two
elements is preferred to a singleton equal to the best element. This unequivo-
cally captures the substantial priority of freedom over indirect utility.
Rule 11 (Cardinality-first lexicographic relation) For all A,B ∈ Π(X),
[A º B if and only if (#A > #B) or (#A = #B and max(A)Rmax(B))]
The sets are ordered according to their cardinality. In case of ties, they are
ordered according to the ranking of their best elements.
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Proposition 10 (Bossert, Pattanaik and Xu (1994)) Quasi-ordering º
satisfies simple dominance (condition 30), simple indirect indifference (con-
dition 32), weak independence (condition ??), and simple priority to freedom
(condition 29) if and only if º is the cardinality-first lexicographic relation.
3.3 Equal consideration of different values
Pluralism of value a priori requires to consider different values without any
priority neither weighting (See, on the contrary, the link between monism
and trade-off of values above). Freedom of choice and utility are both and
meanwhile considered for their intrinsic value. They are considered incom-
mensurable. This induces two kinds of results: either incompleteness, either
impossibilities.
3.3.1 Incompleteness
Putting two values on the same plane means that both of them need to be
satisfied to make a judgement. Whenever one value contradicts the other, no
conclusion can be drawn.
Condition 30 (Simple dominance ) ∀x, y ∈ X, xPy ⇒ {x} Â {y}
Simple dominance captures the intrinsic value of utility.
Condition 31 (Simple monotonicity) ∀x, y ∈ X such that x 6= y, {x, y} ∼
{x}.
According to the simple indirect indifference condition, the best element
always play a dominant role in ranking two elements sets.
Condition 32 (Simple indirect indifference) ∀ distinct x, y, z ∈ X , xPyPz ⇒
{x, y} ∼ {x, z}.
The weak indirect preference condition implicitly assign a priority to con-
siderations of the individual’s preferences over considerations of freedom.
Condition 33 (Weak indirect preference) ∀A ∈ Π(X) with #A > 1,
¬ (A\{max(A)} Â {max(A)})
According to simple non-comparability condition, there is no trade-offs
between utility and freedom in simple comparisons. Let ∞ denote the non-
comparability relation associated with º.
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Condition 34 (Simple freedom-utility noncomparability) ∀x, y, z ∈ X
distincts, xPyPz ⇔ {x}∞{y, z}
The dominance relation requires that the two conditions, cardinality and
indirect utility, are both satisfied, though we can very well imagine numerous
cases where these two conditions do not meet. In this latter case, the result
characterizes incompleteness.
Rule 12 (Dominance relation) ∀A,B ∈ Π(X), A º B if and only if (max(A)Rmax(B)
and #A > #B)
Proposition 11 (Bossert, Pattanaik et Xu (1994)) Preorder º satisfies
simple dominance (condition 9), simple monotonicity (condition 31), simple
indirect indifference (condition 32), weak independence (condition 28), weak
indirect preference (condition 33), and simple freedom-utility noncomparability
(condition 34) if and only if º is the dominance relation.
3.3.2 Impossibilities
A second way to capture equal consideration of freedom and utility is to require
they are both satisfied. But this induces impossibility results.
According to the preference basedness condition, a set in which an preferred
option has been substituted to another one will always be preferred. This
condition captures the role of utility in ranking opportunity sets.
Condition 35 (Preference basedness) ∀A ∈ Π(X), x ∈ X \ A, y ∈ A,
[xRy if and only if (A \ {y}) ∪ {x} º A].
The minimal preference for freedom condition is a weaker version of the
simple monotonicity condition. It captures the fact that freedom has some
importance in itself.
Condition 36 (Minimal preference for freedom) For all A ∈ Π(X) with
]A ≥ 2, ∃B ⊆ A such that A Â B.
Let the elements of X be xi, i = 1, ..., n. For each i = 1, ..., n, let (xij)j∈N be
a sequence converging to xi. According to the continuity conditions, a small
perturbation of the alternatives in a given set of opportunities should only
have a small impact on the ranking of the set vis-a`-vis all other sets.
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Condition 37 (Continuity of º) ∀A ∈ Π(X),
[∀j ∈ N : {x1j , ..., xnj } º A]⇒ {x1, ..., xn} º A
and
[∀j ∈ N : A º {x1j , ..., xnj }]⇒ A º {x1, ..., xn}
Condition 38 (Continuity of Â) ∀A ∈ Π(X),
{x1j , ..., xnj } Â A⇒ [∃j0∀j ≥ j0 : {x1, ..., xn} Â A]
and
A Â {x1j , ..., xnj } ⇒ [∃j0∀j ≥ j0 : A Â {x1, ..., xn}]
Proposition 12 (Puppe (1995)) There does not exist any preorder º such
that º satisfies preference basedness (condition 35), minimal preference for
freedom (condition 22), and continuity (conditions 37 and 38).
N. Gravel (1994), (1998) did establish some similar impossibility results in
this framework.
3.4 Discontinuity
We have presented above two extreme positions. Perfect commensurability,
through weighting, amounts to one value-based ranking. Besides, total in-
commensurability, through trumping or equal consideration of values, allows
to attach some intrinsic importance to both values, but it is so demanding
that it induces either incompleteness, impossibilities or gives eventually too
much importance to one of the two values. These extremes are disturbing and
we would appreciate to capture the idea that both values have some intrinsic
importance without dramatic inequalities of treatment and, yet, allows some
general rankings. We want to find something between trumping and weighting
values.
J. Griffin (1986: 85–89) does propose a way out: discontinuity. He takes
the example of commensurability between prosperity and liberty: ‘when we
see that liberty is not, in the strict sense, lexically prior to prosperity, it is
natural to retreat to the view that, if prosperity is assured to some minimal
level, then the priority holds. But [...] Liberty, as important it is, is not such
a heavyweight among prudential values that, even in the limited domain we
have defined, it is bound to trump any other value capable of achieving fairly
heavyweight status itself. The mistakes here seems to be to think that certain
values – liberty for instance – as types outrank other values – prosperity for
instance. Since values, as types, can vary greatly in weight from token to
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token, it would be surprising to find this kind of discontinuity at the type – or
at least at a fairly abstract type – level.’
In other words, we do not consider wether the values may be satisfied
or not in some specific situations. We rather consider them to be more or
less satisfied, information that is specifically derived from the rankings. This
means that there is a way to measure how satisfied each of the values is. With
discontinuity, a certain quantity of one value, let’s say utility, is necessary to be
able to say that, after that point, the other value, let’s say freedom, becomes
more valuable. In others words, it is necessary to attain trigger value for each
of them to consider the importance of the other (conversing lexical order) or
that the other may now outranked the first one (conversing weights).
Baujard and Gaspart (2004), in a economic environnement framework, have
used such a notion of discontinuity to capture the idea of a specific commen-
surability between utility and freedom, taken as the value of the exercice of
significant hard choices.
3.5 Concluding remarks on value rankings
This section was devoted to value rankings, that can be interepreted as global
well-being rankings as well. Freedom is then considered as an element between
others to induce the rankings, while it has been considered as the key element
in the previous section. Freedom of choice and utility are here considered as
the two elements to be captured through the rankings of opportunity sets. As
there are two distinct values, we discussed different ways of commensurability
between them. When freedom and utility are weighted in the ranking, we
then actually consider there exists just one substantial meta-value above all,
namely utility; therefore, we obtain welfarist rankings. Weighting is a way
to transform plurality of value in actual monism. To avoid the restriction of
plurality to an actual welfarism, we can imagine to require both values, even
though distinct, to be respected; we then obtain either very incomplete or
impossibility results. Another way to keep up with a plurality of values is
to set the importance of one above the other, namely lexicographic order. In
this case, we do give a prior importance to one value over the other but they
remain distinct. Pluralism is respected but one value is then of a considerable
importance over the other. A last and promising way to capture the idea of
real commensurability of values and to keep a certain equality in their role is
discontinuity: freedom becomes important if utility is enough satisfied, and
conversely.
30
Conceptions of freedom and ranking opportunity sets. A typology
References
[1] Arrow, K. J. 1995, A note on freedom and flexibility. In Choice,
welfare and development, K. Basu, P. Pattanaik, and K. Suzumura, Eds.
Clarendon Press, ch. 1, pp. 7–16.
[2] Barbera, S., Bossert, W. and Pattanaik, P. K. Ranking sets
of objects. In Handbook of utility theory, S. Barbera`, P. Hammond, and
C. Seidl, Eds.
[3] Baujard, A. and Gaspart, F., 2004. Opportunity and equity in eco-
nomic environment. Document de Travail CREM, University of Caen.
[4] Bavetta, S. 1995. Individual liberty betrayed: The case of the
’freedom of choice literature.’. Journal of Public Finance and Public
Choice/Economia delle Scelte Pubbliche 13, 1, pp. 35–49.
[5] Bavetta, S. 2000. Measuring freedom of choice: An alternative view of
a recent literature. Social Choice and Welfare 22, 1, pp. 29–48.
[6] Bavetta, S. and Del Seta, M. 2001. Constraints and the measure-
ment of freedom of choice. Theory and Decision 50, 3, pp. 213–38.
[7] Berlin, I. 1969. Four essays on liberty. Oxford University Press.
[8] Bervoets, S. and Gravel, N. 2003. Appraising diversity with an
ordinal notion of similarity: An axiomatic approach. Document de travail,
IDEP-GREQAM.
[9] Bossert, W. 1997. Opportunity sets and individual well-being. Social
Choice and Welfare 14, 1, pp. 97–112.
[10] Bossert, W., Pattanaik, P. and Xu, Y. 1994. Ranking opportunity
sets : An axiomatic approach. Journal of Economic Theory 63, 2, pp. 326–
345.
[11] Bossert, W., Pattanaik, P. and Xu, Y., 2002. Similarity of op-
tions and the measurement of diversity. CRDE, Universite´ de Montre´al,
Working paper n. 11-2002.
[12] Carter, I. 1999. A measure of freedom. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
[13] Carter, I. 2004. Choice, freedom, and freedom of choice. Social Choice
and Welfare 22, 1, pp. 61–81.
[14] Fleurbaey, M., Gravel, N., Laslier, J.-F. and Trannoy, A.
1998. Freedom in Economics, New perspectives in normative analysis.
Routledge Studies in Social and Political Thought.
[15] Glover, J. 1977. Causing death and saving lives. Penguin Books,
Harmondsworth.
31
Conceptions of freedom and ranking opportunity sets. A typology
[16] Gravel, N. 1994. Can a ranking of opportunity sets attach intrinsic
importance to freedom of choice? American Economic Review: Papers
and Proceedings 84, 2, pp. 454–458.
[17] Gravel, N. 1998. Ranking opportunity sets on the basis of their freedom
of choice and their ability to satisfy preferences: A difficulty. Social Choice
and Welfare 15, 3, pp. 371–382.
[18] Griffin, J. 1986. Well-being: Its meaning, Measurement, and Moral
Importance. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
[19] Haslett, D. 1990. What is utility ? Economics and Philosophy 6 ,
pp. 65–94.
[20] Hayek, F. A. 1960. The constitution of liberty. The University of
Chicago Press, Chicago, Paperback edition, 1978.
[21] Jones, P. and Sudgen, R. 1982. Evaluating choices. International
Journal of Law and Economics , pp. 47–65.
[22] Klemisch-Alhert, M. 1993. Freedom of choice, a comparaison of
different rankings of opportunity sets. Social Choice and Welfare 10, 3,
pp. 189–207.
[23] Kreps, D. M. 1979. A representation theorem for preference for flexi-
bility. Econometrica 47, 3, pp. 565–577.
[24] Mill, J. S. 1973-1974. A system of logic ratiocinative and inductive:
being a connected view of the principles of evidence and the methods of
scientific investigation. No. 7-8 in Collected works of John Stuart Mill.
University of Toronto press, Routledge and K. Paul, Toronto, London,
Introduction by R. F. McRae.
[25] Mill, J. S. 1991. On liberty. Routledge philosophers in focus. Routledge,
London, New York.
[26] Nehring, K. and Puppe, C. 2002. A theory of diversity. Econometrica
70, 3, pp. 1155–1198.
[27] Oppenheim, F. E. 1995. Social freedom and its parameters. Journal of
Theoretical Politics 7, 4, pp. 403–420.
[28] Oppenheim, F. E. 2004. Social freedom: Definition, measurability,
valuation. Social Choice and Welfare 22, 1, pp. 175 – 185.
[29] Pattanaik, P. K. and Xu, Y. 1990. On ranking opportunity sets in
terms of freedom of choice. Recherches E´conomiques de Louvain 56, 3/4,
pp. 383–390.
[30] Pattanaik, P. K. and Xu, Y. 1998. On preference and freedom.
Theory and Decision 44 , pp. 173–198.
32
Conceptions of freedom and ranking opportunity sets. A typology
[31] Pattanaik, P. K. and Xu, Y. 2000. On diversity and freedom of
choice. Mathematical Social Sciences 40 , pp. 123–130.
[32] Peragine, V. 1999. The distribution and redistribution of opportunity.
Journal of Economic Surveys 13, 1, pp. 37–69.
[33] Puppe, C. 1995. Freedom of choice and rational decisions. Social Choice
and Welfare 12, 2, pp. 137–153.
[34] Puppe, C. 1996. An axiomatic approach to ‘preference for freedom
choice’. Journal of Economic Theory 68 , pp. 174–199.
[35] Puppe, C. 1998, Individual freedom and social choice. In Freedom in
Economics, New perspectives in normative analysis [14], ch. 3, pp. 49–68.
[36] Romero-Medina, A. 2001. More on preference and freedom. Social
Choice and Welfare 18, 1, pp. 179–191.
[37] Rosenbaum, E. F. 2000. On measuring freedom. Journal of Theoretical
Politics 12, 2, pp. 205–227.
[38] Sen, A. K. 1985. Commodities and Capabilities. Oxford University
Press.
[39] Sen, A. K. 1990. Welfare, freedom and social choice: A reply. Recherches
E´conomiques de Louvain 56, 3/4, pp. 454–485.
[40] Sen, A. K. 1991. Welfare, preference and freedom. Journal of Econo-
metrics 50, 3, pp. 15–29.
[41] Steiner, H. 1983, How free : Computing personal liberty. In Of liberty,
Phillips-Griffiths, Ed. Cambridge University Press, pp. 73–89.
[42] van Hees, M. 1998. On the analysis of negative freedom. Theory and
Decision 45, 2, pp. 175–197.
[43] van Hees, M. 1999, Freedom of choice and diversities of options: Some
difficulties. In Logic, game theory, and social choice. Proceedings of the
International Conference, LGS’99, H. de Swart, Ed. pp. 491–503.
[44] van Hees, M. 2004. Freedom of choice and diversity of options: Some
difficulties. Social Choice and Welfare 22, 1, pp. 253–66.
33
